The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley
6 Berkeley’s argument for immaterialism
Berkeley's philosophical view is often described as an argument for “immaterialism”, by which is meant a denial of the existence of matter (or more precisely, material substance). But he also, famously, argued in support of three further theses. He argued for idealism, the thesis that mind constitutes the ultimate reality. He argued that the existence of sensible things consists in their being perceived. And he argued that the mind which is the substance of the world is a single infinite mind - in short, God. These are four different theses, but they are intimately connected in Berkeley's presentation of them, the arguments for the first three sharing most of their premisses and steps. My chief purpose in what follows is to give an account of these arguments, their interactions, and the assumptions and methods underlying them. Doing so makes their strengths and weaknesses both conspicuous and perspicuous.
Chapter content
You may be asked to log in when following these links.
Acquiring and configuring PDF viewing software is described further in Help with PDF Content, which also provides accessibility advice.
Bookmark this entryDigital Object Identifier: 10.1017/CCOL0521450330.007
How to cite (Modern Language Association style):
Grayling, A. C. "Berkeley’s argument for immaterialism." The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley. Ed. Kenneth P. Winkler. Cambridge University Press, 2006. Cambridge Collections Online. Cambridge University Press. 09 February 2010 DOI:10.1017/CCOL0521450330.007